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FINDING COMMON GROUND: 
The Missing Pieces of Middle East Peace 
Ami Ayalon & Sari Nusseibeh 
INTRODUCTION 
by Kyle C. Olive* 
 
Following the atrocities of the Nazi Holocaust of the Second World War, 
Great Britain’s earlier attempts to create a homeland for the Jewish people 
on the Eastern edge of the Mediterranean Sea intensified.1  The region then 
known as Palestine was of historical significance to Jews, and the British 
were attempting to assuage the plight of the Jewish people in the aftermath 
of one of the most grievous acts of genocide in human history.  In doing so, 
however, the British attempted simultaneously to appease the Arabs who 
were living in the region.  Britain had assumed the Palestine Mandate in 
1922 from the League of Nations, the United Nation’s predecessor.2  By 
1947, the British recognized that they “lacked the power to impose a 
settlement in Palestine”3 and decided to return the Mandate of the territory 
to the UN.  
In November of 1947, the UN adopted General Assembly Resolution 
181, which called for a partition of Palestine into three entities: an Arab 
state, a Jewish state, and an internationally administered city of Jerusalem.5  
Many Palestinian Arabs, however, were unwilling to accept this partition 
plan and argued that the UN had “no right to allocate a majority of their 
territory to the Zionists.”6  The surrounding Arab states then entered 
Palestine to prevent implementation of the partition plan.7  The Zionists 
responded by announcing the establishment of the State of Israel, and were 
successful in defending against the invading Arab nations.8  By the end of 
the war, the newly-formed State of Israel had captured all of the land that 
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had been designated as part of the Jewish state under UN Resolution 181, as 
well as the land that had been designated to be part of the Arab state (minus 
the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Gaza strip, known collectively as 
the occupied territory).9 
During and immediately subsequent to the 1948 war, an estimated 
860,000 Palestinians fled their homes and became refugees.10  After the 
war, the Palestinian refugees sought to return to their homes and 
international sentiment favored such repatriation.11  The UN established 
refugee camps and suggested that Palestinians resettle in neighboring Arab 
countries and seek compensation from Israel for the loss of their land.12  
The United States offered to assist Israel with compensation for the 
Palestinian refugees, while the UN spent almost $300 million providing 
them with food, housing, and medical care.13  The Palestinian refugees, 
however, rejected resettlement as an option and have continued to this day 
to press for the right to return to the homes from which they were expelled 
or fled.14  As of June 2003, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency 
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) estimates the total 
number of Palestinian refugees to be approximately 4.1 million.15 
Following the 1948 war, Israel became an island in a sea of hostile Arab 
nations.  The large refugee populations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
became the source of many guerilla raids into the territory of the State of 
Israel.16  The situation became even more critical in 1956 when France and 
Britain, in conjunction with Israel, invaded Egypt in response to the 
Egyptian government’s decision to nationalize the Suez Canal.17  Though 
the United States was eventually successful in convincing the British, 
French, and Israeli forces to withdraw from the Suez, conflict erupted again 
in 1967 when Israel invaded Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in a preemptive 
maneuver designed to forestall invasions by those states.18  During the 
invasion, known as the Six Day War, Israel took control of the entire Sinai 
Peninsula, the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the so-called West Bank from Jordan, 
and the Golan Heights from Syria.19   
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Violence erupted again in 1973 when Egypt and Syria invaded Israel on 
the Jewish holy day, Yom Kippur.  Despite the initial success of the 
invading armies, Israel was ultimately unsuccessful in recapturing the 
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula.20  The United States later brokered a 
peace agreement normalizing the relations between Egypt and Israel in 
exchange for a return of a demilitarized Sinai to Egypt.21   
Throughout the post-1948 period, while Israel was engaged in periodic 
military clashes with its Arab neighbors, an increasingly organized guerilla 
campaign was simultaneously gaining strength.22  In 1964, the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in Jerusalem to serve as an 
umbrella organization for the various guerilla groups.  After the Six Day 
War, Yassir Arafat, who had been involved in resistance against Israel since 
the mid-1950s, became the official chairman of the PLO and urged 
residents living in Gaza and the West Bank to resist Israel’s occupation.23  
The PLO launched artillery and rocket attacks from Lebanon on the 
population centers in northern Israel, until Israel finally invaded Lebanon in 
1982 and forced PLO loyalists out of the country.  After being driven from 
Lebanon, the PLO reassembled in the northern African country of Tunisia.24 
By the late 1980s, large segments of the populations in Gaza and the 
West Bank began to rise up against the occupying Israeli forces.  Rather 
than being at the behest of the PLO or other groups, this Intifada, or 
uprising, was a spontaneous reaction to the Israeli occupation.25  The 
Intifada, which often involved nothing more than adolescent rock-throwers, 
brought normal life in the occupied territories to a virtual standstill.  Israel’s 
violent military response to the uprising turned international support in 
favor of the plight of the Palestinians and forced the Israelis to the 
negotiating table in the Spanish capital of Madrid in late 1991.  When 
Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister of Israel 1992, negotiations were 
underway between the Israelis, Palestinians, Jordanians, and Syrians.26 
These negotiations led to the creation of the Oslo Accords.  Under the 
Oslo Accords, the Israelis agreed to turn over much of the occupied 
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territories, as well as many of the Palestinians it was holding in its prisons, 
in exchange for a ceasing of hostility.  The Oslo Accords consisted of two 
sets of agreements. The first of these land-for-peace agreements (Oslo I) 
was designed to lay out the broad principles for achieving peace, and 
provided for joint recognition of, and limited Palestinian self-rule in, the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho. The second round of agreements (Oslo II) spoke 
with much more specificity about a gradual withdrawal by Israel from the 
occupied territories and a transition to Palestinian self-rule in most of the 
West Bank.27  With some understandable skepticism, the Oslo Accords 
were greeted with great hope both in the region and in the international 
community.28  For their efforts in negotiating these agreements, both Rabin 
and Arafat were awarded a Nobel Peace Prize.29 
Even in the light of prospects for peace, acts of violence continued to 
darken the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians.  In 1994, Israel 
and Jordan entered into an agreement to end the state of war between them 
that had existed for forty-six years.30  In late 1995, however, an Israeli 
extremist who opposed the peace process assassinated Prime Minister 
Rabin.  Then, in early 1996, a series of suicide bombers hit several Israeli 
targets.  Hezbollah, an anti-Israel organization operating out of Lebanon, 
launched rocket attacks from Lebanon into northern Israel.  Israel retaliated 
by launching attacks into southern Lebanon and blockading the port of 
Beirut.31 
 In this hostile climate, the Israeli electorate chose the conservative Likud 
party candidate, Benjamin Netanyahu, as its new prime minister in 1996.  
Netanyahu opposed the land-for-peace agreements negotiated by his 
predecessors but vowed to continue the process.32  In 1997, the Palestinians 
were given control over most of the West Bank city of Hebron, and Israel 
agreed in 1998 to withdraw from the additional areas of the West Bank.  
The Palestinians also pledged to make stronger efforts to fight terror.33   
In the 1999 Israeli elections, Netanyahu was unseated by Ehud Barak, 
who promised to move the stalled peace process forward.  In the fall of that 
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year, Barak and Arafat pledged to finalize an agreement about borders and 
the status of Jerusalem within one year and continue implementation of the 
hand-over of the West Bank.34 
In May 2000, Israeli forces withdrew from southern Lebanon.  
Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians brokered by President 
Clinton ended without success.  The peace process was further compro-
mised by a visit by the Likud party’s Ariel Sharon to the Haram esh-Sherif 
(also known as the Temple Mount) in Jerusalem, the site of two of Islam’s 
holiest mosques.  The visit precipitated violence in the occupied 
territories.35   
In February 2001, Sharon was overwhelmingly elected Prime Minister 
and initiated preemptive military incursions into Palestinian territory to 
strike suspected terrorist organizations.36  The level of Palestinian violence 
also increased and Sharon ordered the reoccupation of West Bank towns.37  
Facing pressure from the international community, the Sharon government 
accepted the so-called road map for peace pressed by the United States, 
Russia, the European Union, and the United Nations in May 2003.38  Talks 
with Palestinian authorities resumed, with the Palestinians negotiating a 
cease-fire with Palestinian militants, while the Israelis made some 
conciliatory moves in Gaza and the West Bank.  However, suicide 
bombings and Israeli retaliation resumed in August.39  In October, Israel 
attacked Syria, bombing what it claimed were terrorist camps in retaliation 
for the suicide bombings.40   
In 2003, Israel began construction of a 400 mile-long fence and security 
wall in the West Bank, which enclosed about 15 percent of the territory that 
was to be brought under Palestinian control.  The wall was extended to 
surround many of the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the annexed 
territory originally slated to be included as part of a settlement with the 
Palestinians.41 
 Throughout the nearly sixty-year period of the modern conflict in the 
region, high expectations and raised hopes for peace have been repeatedly 
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dashed.  The situation on the ground has become increasingly intractable.  It 
is within this context that two men, Ami Ayalon,42 a long-time member of 
the Israeli security community, and Dr. Sari Nusseibeh,43 a Palestinian 
intellectual from the West Bank, came together in 2003 finally to confront 
two of the issues that have stalled previous peace initiatives.  These two 
men recognized that what has been conspicuously absent from previous 
peace proposals has been any attempt to deal with the hardest, most 
controversial issues first, and to ask the people most affected by the conflict 
for their input.   
Both men admit that the substance of their proposal is unoriginal.  It has 
five main points, which are spelled out on a single page document.  First, 
there should be two states: Israel for the Jewish people and Palestine for the 
Palestinian people.  Second, the borders of these states should be based on 
the borders as they existed prior to the Six Day War in 1967, with any 
modifications to be determined on an equitable one-to-one exchange of 
territory on the basis of security, territorial contiguity, and demographic 
considerations.  Third, the city of Jerusalem should be an open city and the 
capital of each of the two states, with Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian 
sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty, and the 
religious cites in the Old City under international supervision.  Fourth, the 
right of the Palestinians to return should be recognized only as to the State 
of Palestine.  Finally, the State of Palestine should be demilitarized, with its 
security guaranteed by the international community.  Upon realization of 
these principles, both sides would agree to release all claims against the 
other and end hostilities.   
This peace initiative, however, has not been without its detractors, 
especially on the Palestinian side.  For many people, including a vocal 
contingent of Palestinian refugees living outside the epicenter of this 
conflict, there can be no resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that 
includes the relinquishment of a Palestinian right of return to the homes in 
which they lived before 1948.  Such a concession is viewed by many as a 
The Missing Pieces of Middle East Peace 421 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 2 • 2004 
necessary prerequisite to the ceasing of hostilities, but many refugees still 
carry the keys to the homes that they or their relatives once occupied and 
believe that international human rights law demands no less than that all 
Palestinian refugees be allowed to return to their former homes.  From the 
Israeli perspective, this outcome is untenable for a variety of reasons.  Chief 
among these reasons is that allowing the mass influx of Palestinians into the 
State of Israel could fundamentally disturb the character of Israel as a 
homeland of the Jewish people.  In a state whose Jewish population makes 
up about 4.8 of the 6.1 million person population,44 the infusion of any 
significant portion of the 4.1 million Palestinian refugees into a democratic 
State of Israel could upset the balance of power between Jewish and non-
Jewish policy makers.  Furthermore, if nothing else, a significant flood of 
refugees into Israel, most of whom would be extremely poor, would exact a 
substantial burden on an Israeli economy that would be forced to integrate 
these refugees into the national workforce. 
From the Israeli side, the most contentious provisions of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh plan are those that involve the Israeli settlements in the occupied 
territories and the related issue of what the borders under a two-state model 
would look like.  For many Israelis, the settlers are pioneers who have 
shaped the boundaries of the state and have served as a first line of defense 
against the hostile neighbors that surround the state.  From an Israeli 
perspective, giving up settlements in the occupied territories forces Israel to 
contract in both literal and metaphorical senses.  A final agreement on 
borders and settlements would mean the end of Israel’s ability to expand its 
external boundaries, which implicates its concomitant ability to provide 
security to its core, if only psychologically. 
What follows is excerpted from presentations that Ayalon and Nusseibeh 
gave in the fall of 2003 in Seattle to explain their proposal, describe their 
motivations for bringing this initiative now, and to answer some of the 
concerns about the initiative’s form and substance.   
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****** 
PRINCIPLES OF AGREEMENT 
Signed by Ami Ayalon & Sari Nusseibeh 
 
1.  Two states for two peoples: Both sides will declare that Palestine is the 
only state of the Palestinian people and Israel is the only state of the Jewish 
people. 
 
2.  Borders: Permanent borders between the two states will be agreed upon 
on the basis of the June 4, 1967 lines, UN resolutions, and the Arab peace 
initiative (known as the Saudi initiative). 
Border modifications will be based on an equitable and agreed-
upon territorial exchange (1:1) in accordance with the vital needs 
of both sides, including security, territorial contiguity, and 
demographic considerations. 
The Palestinian State will have a connection between its two 
geographic areas, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
After establishment of the agreed borders, no settlers will remain 
in the Palestinian State. 
3.  Jerusalem: Jerusalem will be an open city, the capital of two states. 
Freedom of religion and full access to holy sites will be guaranteed to all. 
Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian 
sovereignty, Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli sovereignty. 
Neither side will exercise sovereignty over the holy places.  The 
State of Palestine will be designated Guardian of al-Haram al-
Sharif for the benefit of Muslims.  Israel will be the Guardian of 
the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people.  The status 
quo on Christian holy site will be maintained.  No excavation will 
take place in or underneath the holy sites without mutual consent. 
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4.  Right of return: Recognizing the suffering and the plight of the 
Palestinian refugees, the international community, Israel, and the 
Palestinian State will initiate and contribute to an international fund to 
compensate them. 
Palestinian refugees will return only to the State of Palestine; Jews 
will return only to the State of Israel. 
The international community will offer to compensate toward 
bettering the lot of those refugees willing to remain in their present 
country of residence, or who wish to immigrate to third-party 
countries. 
The Palestinian State will be demilitarized and the international 
community will guarantee its security and independence. 
5.  End of conflict: Upon the full implementation of these principles, all 
claims on both sides and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will end. 
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***** 
AMI AYALON (AA):  Let me start by explaining not what we are doing, 
but why, at least in my case, I am doing it.  Personally, I think that this is 
just as important.  It is very easy to describe the realities in the Middle East 
today—news that you read and that you see on television—but it is more 
than one can handle.  It is strange for me because I did not initially choose 
to deal with peace issues or to participate in trying to create a new Middle 
East. 
Two years ago, a good friend of mine approached me.  It was a year after 
the Intifada had started and he said to me, “Ami, I just came back from 
London.  I visited the Museum of War in London.  It is a five-floor 
museum.  The upper two floors are dedicated to the Holocaust.  When you 
leave these two floors, there is small plaque with a quote from Edmund 
Burke reading: ‘For evil to prevail, it is only necessary for good people to 
do nothing.’”45  Then he said, “I’m a good person.  I’m an ordinary person.  
What should I do?” 
One or two months later, I met Professor Sari Nusseibeh in London in a 
meeting where Israelis and Palestinians were discussing where we were and 
what we should be doing now.  It seemed as though there were hundreds of 
meetings like this—a whole industry of peace.  Although I did not see 
myself as part of this industry, I decided to go at least once. 
So, I went and it was very important.  I am very glad I did it, but during 
one of the breaks, while preparing coffee, a Palestinian friend approached 
me and said, “Ami, finally we have won.  We, the Palestinians, have won.”  
I asked him, “How did you win?  You have lost so many people.  You are 
losing pieces of your territory.  You are losing your dream for a state.  What 
is the meaning of victory?”  He said to me, “You don’t understand.  Victory 
for us means seeing you suffer.  Finally, after more than fifty years, we are 
not the only ones who suffer in the Middle East.  As long as we suffer, you 
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will suffer.”  He ended by saying, “Finally we have achieved a balance of 
power.” 
 For me it was very, very difficult.  I remember that I became very 
emotional.  When we came back to the table, I asked Professor Mary 
Kaldor,46 the moderator, if we could change the focus of our discussion to 
identifying the meaning of victory in the Middle East at the beginning of 
2002. 
We did not achieve any operational results from the discussion, but it was 
the beginning of our initiative.  When I returned to Israel, I was interviewed 
by Israeli national television, and the subject was: “How can we win this 
war?”   This was a war we had to win and I was an expert.  I had been a part 
of the Israeli security community for thirty-eight years.  I had taken part in 
all of our wars during that period.  The journalist asked me, “How can we 
win?  What should we do in order to win this war?”  I told her that I did not 
want to win this particular war.  She asked me why, and I told her that the 
price of winning was too high.  The price was not only in bodies on both 
sides, but a price that we would pay every day by sacrificing our identity 
and our moral values.  Moreover, I told her that victory had no meaning in 
the Middle East today.   
No matter how many battles we win we cannot achieve victory, because 
victory for us means creating a situation in which Israel is a democracy and 
a safe home for the Jewish people.  This is what we want.  We are not going 
to get it by winning these battles.  Continuing to operate in this way will 
only deepen the status quo.  We are running out of time because in a few 
years—whether it be twenty years, ten years or five (and some will tell you 
that it is too late already)—a two-state solution will not be a viable option.  
If a two-state solution is not an option anymore, Israel will not be a 
democracy and a safe home for the Jewish people.  A one-state solution will 
leave neither a Jewish, nor a Palestinian democratic state. 
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So, what should we do?  We should do what Dr. Nusseibeh and I are 
trying to do.  First, we must create a clear vision—a proposal that will be 
short enough for people to read.  People do not read more than one page. 
This is the vision.  It has five points.  First, there will be two states: a 
state for the Jewish people and state for the Palestinian people.  Second, the 
borders will be based on the borders that existed prior to the 1967 war, with 
an exchange of territory.  Third, Jerusalem will be organized as President 
Clinton put it on the table, with Jewish neighborhoods under Israeli 
sovereignty, Arab neighborhoods under Palestinian sovereignty, and the 
Holy places under the sovereignty of God.  In Jerusalem’s common area, 
the Old City, Palestine would be the guardian of the mosques, and Israel 
would be the guardian of the Western Wall.  Fourth, as for the right of 
return, it will be solved within the context of the Palestinian state, meaning 
Palestinians who want to return will return only to the state of Palestine, and 
Jews will return only to the state of Israel.  The Palestinian refugees will be 
compensated by the international community and will be able to choose to 
stay in their host countries or to go to third countries.  Fifth, as for security, 
Palestine will be demilitarized, and the international community will 
guarantee its security and independence. 
This is the whole vision.  There is nothing new about it.  Everything has 
been discussed before.  Most of it was agreed upon.  However, the people 
did not believe that it was possible because they were never asked for their 
opinion about it.  Leaders tried to achieve it alone. 
To achieve this vision, we must first go “back from the future.”  That is, 
we must start from the future and work backwards.  Second, we must go 
“back to the people,” which means we have to ask the people for their 
consent because they have the power finally to create peace.  Our leaders 
have tried to do it during the last ten years and have failed.  They have 
failed not because of a lack of charisma but because we did not give them 
the power to do it.  Unless Palestinians say to Arafat, or to any other 
Palestinian leader, that this is the price that they are ready to pay, he will 
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never have the power to do it.  Unless the Jewish people say to our leaders 
that this is a price that we want to pay, our leaders will not have the power 
to do it.  This is what we have seen in the past.  It is up to us to show our 
leaders what we want by signing on. 
Today, we have today more than 150,000 signatures on both sides.47  We 
believe that the international community will adopt it.  Therefore, we, 
Palestinians and Israelis, can show the way to our leaders. 
 
DR. SARI NUSSEIBEH (SN):  To say something additional, perhaps I 
should mention one or two points from my own perspective about how I see 
things developing.  First, I’d like to say that when one looks at the conflict 
between the Israelis and us, one very often cannot see beyond the cloud 
raised by the actual shooting and the violent engagement.  From the 
Palestinian point of view, you cannot really see very much hope.  All you 
see is the decreasing space, increasing pressure, and increasing frustration. 
I am not sure, but it seems like people somehow get used to being 
frustrated and get used to the state of conflict in which they find themselves.  
Not that they become fatalistic, but that they begin to somehow surrender 
their will, even their hopes and desires to this frustrating, restrictive 
situation almost as if to say that there is no way out, no exit, and that this is 
our lot.  Nobody has been able to do anything about it so far; why should 
anybody be able to do anything about it now?  Perhaps at most, some of 
them will say what Ami’s friend told him in London; namely, that we have 
become at least strong enough to cause you pain just as a way of revenging 
ourselves against you.  There is now a way of responding or hitting you 
back to cause you pain commensurate with the pain you have caused us.  
This does not say something very intelligent, in my opinion, but reflects the 
current situation—a tragic situation. 
If people look upon reality this way, both on the Israeli and the 
Palestinian side, then clearly nothing can or will be done, and the situation 
will just continue getting worse.  Imagine how, if people in the region see it 
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this way, people abroad must see it.  When you look at the main players—
the United States, the European Union, the United Nations—you wonder 
what they think.  In the final analysis, they have also come to surrender 
themselves to this dim reality, a reality in which they cannot really do very 
much. 
Yes, maybe they come up with statements here and there to denounce or 
to oppose.  Two days ago, for example, we heard in the United Nations 
General Assembly that there was a resolution passed by a majority of the 
members calling upon Israel to stop building this wall across the territory in 
the West Bank.48  But that is the most they do: a resolution here, a 
declaration there.  In real terms, you also sense that the major players also 
feel some kind of impotence and surrender themselves to this reality that 
seems to be intractable and insoluble. 
From the Palestinian point of view—certainly from my point of view as 
an individual—it seems crazy to just let things go this way.  It seems to 
constitute a major challenge to try and think of ways to overcome this 
problem and prove that one is able to control—to be on top of—a problem 
that otherwise controls one’s life. 
The Israelis and the Palestinians, as we all know, started negotiations 
about ten years ago in Madrid and Oslo.  I personally believe that this was 
truly a major breakthrough after about forty years of conflict, a major 
breakthrough in the sense that there was a genuine attempt to try and change 
the course of history.  A lot of effort was spent in trying to do this, but it 
failed.  It failed for so many different reasons.  It failed in large part because 
we, the Palestinians, Israelis, and especially our leaderships, did not take 
that opportunity seriously enough and put all our effort towards ensuring 
successful negotiations.  
Things collapsed.  Three years ago the whole thing just broke down.  I 
personally find it tragic that if we try to analyze why it broke down, we 
have different narratives.  It is tragic that this has befallen us—the collapse 
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of the only opportunity we had—its occurrence is not explicable by us in 
any one single way.  That is a tragedy in addition to a tragedy. 
As the violence has unfolded in the past three years, and as things have 
seemed to be getting worse and worse, some of us on the Palestinian side 
decided that something must be done.  We decided that we must assert a 
new position, put an end to what seems to be the absence of reason, and try 
to track a course back to negotiations. 
However, it seemed very obvious to us that even if we succeeded in 
bringing the leaders back to negotiations, there would be no guarantee that 
we would actually be able to make those negotiations succeed.  There have 
been negotiations before.  The only way we thought it was possible for our 
leaders to agree was to make them start by deciding on what they wanted to 
reach at the end of their negotiations.  This was something that the two sides 
had not dared to deal with in the negotiations before—the hot issues, the 
sensitive issues, the final status issues: Jerusalem, borders, settlements, and 
refugees.  These are the real issues that were not addressed before, and they 
were not addressed because the two sides were not sufficiently daring to 
address and resolve them.  In the past, they have decided to put them on the 
shelf and to wait until our communities were more mature.  Only then 
would we come to deal with these issues and be ready to make the 
necessary concessions. 
But, as the two leaderships shelved those final status issues, the situation 
just got worse on the ground.  Finally, with the various attempts at bringing 
the two leaderships back to negotiations with the road map, we looked and 
saw that the same mistake had been repeated in the road map; the final 
status issues were missing.  They were not, however, missing in the speech 
that President Bush made on June 4, 2003.49  The road map contained the 
other components of the Bush speech, but it did not contain the end vision 
of the negotiations.  We looked at this and said to ourselves, “This is going 
to fail, too.” 
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Therefore, we decided to try to develop a one-page statement, a statement 
that would contain the principles of the final status.  We decided that if the 
United Nations, the United States, the European Union, and our respective 
leaderships were not going to do it, then we, the people would do it 
ourselves.  This is how we started: we wrote up one page stating what we 
thought was possible and necessary to make peace.  Instead of going 
directly to the leaders, we decided that we would go to the people in order 
to get their input into this.  Surprisingly, we discovered there are a lot of 
people out there among the Israelis and the Palestinians who are far more 
daring than their leaders and who are prepared to say and put their names 
down on a statement that contains the proposed concessions on both sides.  
Thus, we started collecting the signatures.  I am not saying that we did not 
come up against opposition and resistance, especially on the Palestinian 
side.  On the other hand, there has been a lot of recognition and response—
positive response—so that, in about three to four months, we have been able 
to gather about 60,000 signatures.  This public support is unprecedented.   
Actually, the whole approach is unprecedented.  Since the conflict began 
over fifty years ago, all the proposed solutions have been conceived 
somewhere else, as if from the clouds and have been parachuted down on 
the Israelis and the Palestinians.  This way of thinking began with the 
United Nations Partition Plan, going through Resolutions 24250 and 338,51 
right up to Camp David, Madrid, Oslo, Tenet, Mitchell, and the road map.   
But, for the first time we have a simple statement that we are trying to send 
back up to the clouds.  We are sowing its seeds on the ground and hoping 
that it will take root, grow, and make the voice of the people heard. The 
people’s voice is saying that we are not crazy, that we would like to live in 
peace, and that we are prepared to pay the necessary price for it. 
This is the first time that a peace proposal is actually circulating among 
the people as a first step; the first time that so many people on both sides, 
Israelis and Palestinians, have actually signed their names to a common 
document; the first time the people are coming together on both sides with a 
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single voice loud enough and clear enough to be heard.  For the first time, 
the people calling for peace and saying, “Yes, we are bold enough to look at 
the matter straight in the face, to take the bull by its horns, and to settle the 
differences and pay the necessary price.”  We realize that the peace we call 
for does not reflect absolute justice; indeed, our focus is less on justice or on 
rights as it is on the interests of the two parties. 
We believe the Israelis and the Palestinians have a common interest.  
This interest lies in the fact that they have a future together and that it is 
incumbent upon us, therefore, to design such a future boldly in which both 
Israelis and Palestinians can live peacefully side by side and finish with the 
state of conflict that has afflicted us for the last fifty years. 
I realize this is a tall order.  I realize a lot of people feel that it is 
impossible, that it is perhaps not even worth thinking about peace.  
However, I, as a Palestinian, as a father, as a husband, as the head of an 
institution, as someone who lives and works and has lived and worked in 
that country, still nurture the hope that such a peace is possible.  I believe 
the people can make it happen if they all to stand up and say, “Yes, we are 
prepared to work for it.”  This is our initiative.  
 
AA:  This is not naive.  It seems naive, but it is not.  Most Israelis and 
Palestinians want something very similar to what we are describing.  We 
see it in the polls.  We have come to understand that we can sacrifice and 
pay this price.  We want a peaceful and democratic state, and we understand 
that we have to pay a very painful concession to achieve it.  Palestinians 
have come to understand that in order to get a free Palestinian state with no 
occupation, they will have to pay a very painful concession when it comes 
to the right of return. 
The only way to go forward is to create a vision.  When I was in the 
Navy, we used to say that for a captain who does not know where he wants 
to sail, there is no wind that will bring him there.  We have to decide where 
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we want to sail.  Without having made such a decision, and in this stormy 
weather, we will arrive nowhere. 
During the last fifteen years, we have been dealing with a process that 
made lots of demands but was afraid to describe the future.  It was too 
sensitive.  Unless we describe a very clear future that serves as the vision, 
we will sail nowhere.  It is very, very difficult for all of us, mainly because 
we have to separate ourselves from our dreams.  We, Israelis, have to 
separate ourselves from the dream of a greater Israel that includes all the 
settlement lands, and the Palestinians have to separate themselves from a 
greater Palestine that includes everything from the Jordan River to the 
Mediterranean Sea.  This awakening process is very difficult and it is why 
the present is so painful.  But, we will prevail, and when I say “we,” I mean 
we, the simple and ordinary people. 
Q:  Why is the right of return and the status of Palestinian refugees such 
a contentious issue in the Palestinian community? 
SN: From the Palestinian perspective, the creation of Israel goes side by 
side with the creation of the refugee problem.  The solution to the refugee 
problem was the major underlying issue that had to be resolved, and 
resolving the conflict without resolving that problem, therefore, is not really 
addressing the root problem.  While this is true in general terms, in actual 
terms the living conditions of the refugees in the various areas where they 
live, whether in the West Bank, Gaza, or in the Arab world, continues to be 
unresolved and unaddressed.  In real terms, this issue has remained the most 
contentious and sensitive issue facing the Palestinians. 
In the mean time, however, another problem arose over the years. That 
problem has to do with the possibility that the Palestinian people, as a 
people, could build a future for themselves. Within the Palestinian context, 
the idea of statehood and independence developed.  As this evolved, there 
was clearly a contradiction and a lack of symmetry because, on the one 
hand, independence meant recognizing Israel, but, on the other hand, it also 
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meant that the question of refugees was pushed further down on the list of 
priorities. 
What Palestinians constantly raise and talk about is exactly this problem.  
I believe that we have to put high on our list of priorities the notion of 
finding salvation for our people, regardless of whether they come from 
refugee or any other backgrounds.  Not everyone agrees with me, of course. 
Q:  Why is the issue of settlements such a sensitive and difficult issue for 
the Israelis? 
AA:  This is the most sensitive issue in Israel today.  I have to remind 
myself that it only became the most sensitive issue recently.  Up until about 
three years ago, most Israelis would have told you that the status of 
Jerusalem was the most sensitive issue, but this taboo was broken by Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak in the summer of 2000. 
When we say “settlers,” I understand that there are various feelings about 
that term in various communities.  I, for example, see myself as someone 
who came from a settlement.  I was born in the Jordan Valley.  My parents, 
who came to Israel during the 1930s, did not believe that an Israeli state 
would be the result of diplomatic meetings.  They believed that to build a 
country, we had to settle and work the land.  They went as far as possible 
from Tel Aviv, which was the center, in order to shape the borders of our 
state. 
Thus, for me, to be in Judea and Samaria52 is a natural process.  Only 
later did we find out that the result of what we were doing caused suffering 
on the Palestinian side.  We understand that we must bring the settlers back.  
The problem is how to do it.  Israelis are divided between people like Prime 
Minister Rabin, who saw settlers as obstacles, as enemies, as a cancer, and 
those who see the settlers as the real pioneers and the fighters who helped 
create the State of Israel. 
The problem is that in order to bring back settlers, we have to change the 
whole Israeli lexicon. We must create a culture and language in which we 
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understand the price that we have pay in order to come to an agreement and 
to bring the settlers into the process.  By describing them as our pioneers, 
telling them that we understand that they will be the people who will have 
to pay the price, and by giving them the opportunity of getting new homes, 
et cetera, I think that we will be able to do it.  On the other hand, I do not 
see how we can exclude scenarios in which there will be violence.  Our 
leadership will have to deal with violence when the time comes. 
Q:  Is there a genuine partner for peace in the current Palestinian 
political climate? 
SN:  I personally believe that the majority of the Palestinians are ready.  
They are prepared to live at peace with Israel on the basis of two states, 
ending occupation, and resolving all the issues that face them.  I also 
believe that, in general, the Palestinian leadership is interested in reaching a 
peace with Israel on that basis. 
The positions, however, are not fixed, nor are they at the same level of 
intensity.  One normally thinks in terms of black and white; you are for 
peace or you are against peace.  But, you can be for peace to different 
degrees.  Among our leadership, there is variety that changes from day to 
day, and from person to person.  It changes in reflection of what the 
situation on the ground looks like. 
I know people always point a finger to Arafat, but I think it is too 
simplistic to do that.  In general, the Palestinian people are prepared to 
make peace, but to make peace, there has to be clarity about what kind of 
peace it is.  In a sense, our statement makes that clear, and therefore, would 
distinguish between people who want peace and people who are against 
peace.   
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Q:  With so many divisions within Israeli society, is it possible that the 
conflict with the Palestinians is what holds Israeli society together against 
a common enemy? 
AA:  Yes, in a way, the conflict with the Palestinians keeps us together.  
However, it is not that we want to fight just to stay together.  In the 1990s, 
most Israelis believed that we would have peace soon.  If now we are able 
to create this vision of a life after conflict, most Israelis will accept it.  The 
problem is how to do it.  It is clear to me that the process will be very 
painful.  We have to understand that the price of bringing back settlers will 
involve not only the human price of moving people from one place to 
another, but also waking people from a dream, a dream that people have 
when they see the State of Israel, the land of Israel, and the people of Israel 
as one entity.  What we would be saying to them is, “Listen, the State of 
Israel is more than the land of Israel.”  This is something very difficult for 
people in Israel to understand or to live with.   
Thus, we have to create a new dream.  The dilemma is how to create this 
dream—a state that is a democracy and a safe home for the Jewish people.  
It is not something that we can learn in the United States or Europe.  We 
have to create it.  This should be our next dream—the dream that unifies us. 
We started this discussion during the 1990s, but we stopped.  In a way we 
are running away from the major problem: What is Israel? 
Q:  How is Palestinian society educating Palestinian children in terms of 
building future generations who would make peace as opposed to 
cultivating a hatred for Israelis and Jews throughout the world? 
SN: With regard to the incitement of children, I’m not going to defend any 
incitement done by Palestinian institutions or establishments.  However, I 
want to say two things.  First, racism is not something that only Palestinians 
have vis-à-vis Jews.  You will find that there is a lot of racism in Israel 
against Arabs.  One has to keep that in mind in order to have a full picture. 
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The second thing is that racism or incitement sometimes comes about 
through reading a book or listening to a mosque, to the radio, or to the 
television.  I often cringe at listening to what is sometimes said.  But, you 
have to take into account something else.  Imagine yourself as a child, 
walking with your parents at an age in which your parents represent for you 
everything in the world to respect and look up to.  Imagine then a 
situation—and it happens all the time—where the parent, with a child 
standing next to him, confronts a soldier.  It does not need to be anything 
dramatic.  There need not be any shooting.  There need not even be any 
violence.  Just imagine the imbalance of master and slave.  Imagine a child 
standing next to his father, seeing his idol totally impotent in front of the 
soldier.  How will the child feel?  He does not need to listen to radios, 
televisions, or to read books.  
I think the situation creates hatred, anger, and frustration.  One can only 
really solve it by going beyond it and creating parity.  I think it can be done 
and I think that it is our duty to try to do it. 
Q:  What can you do about the extremists who are determined to 
undermine this process? 
AA:  The whole idea is to create a different reality by creating a vision.  
Most Israelis tend to forget that in the first nine months of the year 2000, 
only one Israeli was killed as a result of terror.53  The level of Jewish 
violence was also much lower then.  We know that when Prime Minister 
Barak offered to give up some of the settlements, there was no violent 
opposition within the settlements.  The reason is that both societies looked 
inward.  Now, Hamas is not fighting the Palestinian street, nor are Jewish 
extremists fighting the Israeli street.   
We, the Israelis, have lost over 900 people during the last three years.54  
There were two factors that made this so.  First, we saw a correlation 
between the level of support for the peace process and the level of violence 
that Hamas used against us.  The higher the support, the lower the attempts 
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to use terror as a legitimate weapon against us.  The second factor was, 
since there was a high level of popular support, the Palestinian security 
organizations could fight Hamas without being labeled Israeli collaborators. 
Thus, the whole idea is to create this vision, this hope, this trust that there 
is a process that will bring forth a Palestinian state.  We have had it in the 
past.  When there is hope, violence decreases.  We just have to create again 
this dream or this hope, and I believe that it is possible. 
Q:  How can you build a lasting peace that is based only on interests and 
not on justice and rights? 
SN: By saying that one should focus one’s discourse on interests rather than 
rights, what I really mean is that there are always different narratives in 
talking about rights.  Clearly, one can have a major polemic, and the 
polemic can go on forever.   It creates its own dynamic of conflict.  I am not 
personally interested in entering into polemics, and I do not believe a 
normal, average, sane Israeli is interested in polemics.  I think polemics are 
for those who can afford it in terms of time and existence.  What we are 
interested in is finding a safe and normal life to live. 
The Palestinians, and humans in general, have different rights.  In our 
case, we have the right of return, but we also have other rights.  The 
Palestinians also have the right to live in freedom, the right to have an 
independent state, and the right not to live under occupation.  These are also 
important rights.  Very often in life, at the level of individuals and also of 
nations, it is important to prioritize—to decide which right takes precedence 
over which other rights—because very often, in the pursuit of the 
fulfillment of one right, one foregoes the ability to fulfill another right. 
I realize that this is a very painful question for the Palestinians, but my 
point is this: we, the Palestinians, in order to be able to fulfill our right to 
live in freedom, will have to forego the fulfillment of the right of return.  
Even as we do this, I believe that we provide the refugees with a future, 
because otherwise they will have no future.  The past fifty years will simply 
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be replicated again in the next fifty years, and the misery that the refugees 
have gone through over the past fifty years will simply be augmented in the 
next fifty years. 
I realize that people often refer to UN resolutions, like UN Resolution 
19455 and other international instruments, and to absolute justice when 
discussing the right of return.  The problem is that these are resolutions that 
live only in the files of the United Nations and have no influence at all on 
the lives of people that are actually suffering, whether in the camps or under 
occupation. 
A child who is born this hour in a refugee camp, to a parent who is fifty 
years old who was born with the creation of the refugees, has two futures 
before him.  One future is to live like his parents in a refugee camp reading 
about United Nations resolutions regarding his rights, but suffering the way 
that his parents suffer.  On the other hand, there is the option of being given 
a chance not to return to that specific home that belonged to his grandfather 
or grandmother in pre-1948 Israel, but to return, nonetheless, to his 
homeland.  He would not be returning fifty years back in time, but at least 
returning to a location in the homeland, perhaps fifty or forty or ten 
kilometers away from his original home. 
I believe not only that it is possible to provide that child with such a 
future, but that it is the duty of the political leadership to provide that child 
with such a future.  It makes no sense to me to leave that child clinging to 
the poetry of UN resolutions. 
Q:  Do you believe there is any benefit in Israel to building the wall that 
divides the lands between the two sides?  Will this help or hinder the 
peace process? 
AA:  I think that we have to maintain our right to defend ourselves and to 
build whatever is necessary.  Yet I think that we have to start from the end 
and go backwards.  We must first agree on where the borders will be and 
then build a wall or a fence.  It is quite different to build something that 
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annexes hundred of thousands of Palestinians, engenders hatred, does not 
solve our security problems, and creates future problems within Israel 
because in reality we are annexing the land and the people. 
I am opposed to the way this wall or fence is being built now.  I am not 
against the concept of building fences in order to be more secure, but I do 
not think that this fence will do that. 
 
SN:  The wall that is being built at the moment envisages taking most of the 
territory of the Palestinians, and forcing the Palestinians to be confined to 
their population centers on about 42 percent of the land.56  Basically, the 
wall fences Palestinians in rather than fencing Arabs out of Israel.  It is not 
along the 1967 borders. 
It is said that good fences make good neighbors, which is true but only if 
you do not build those fences on your neighbor’s property.  The problem 
with the fence system that is being created is actually far more serious.  If it 
continues the way it is going, it will be a major obstacle to a two-state 
solution down the line.  It will be the introduction of a one-state system in 
which the Palestinians are living in cages under the authority or supervision 
of the Israelis.  It will be a very ugly system, and it will deny both the Israeli 
and Palestinian dreams of creating something enduring and good.  This wall 
needs to be stopped. 
Q:  Why demilitarize Palestine?  Why not demilitarize both Israel and 
Palestine, and the international community can guarantee security for 
both? 
SN:  It is true that the demilitarization provision was actually put in place or 
requested by the Israeli side.  However, it is one I would have placed there 
as a condition from the Palestinian perspective.  If people look at my own 
writings and references in the past ten or fifteen years, they will see that I 
have been calling constantly for a demilitarized Palestinian state.  I do not 
see the Palestinians ever investing enough in militarization to create an 
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army that would either be capable of conquering Israel or one that could be 
capable of defending itself against its next-door neighbor, nuclear Israel.  
The calculation is like this: you are putting money towards a machine that is 
not going to have any purpose.  It is far better, therefore, to put this money 
into something that will actually make the Palestinians powerful: education, 
knowledge, science, and advancement.  This is where real power lies, and 
this is the kind of power I would like my Palestinian society to be proud 
of—not the power of guns. 
 
AA:  It is very complicated.  We are not living in an ideal world.  Each of 
us has not only a personal, but also a national history.  I do not think you 
can ask Israelis to sign a petition demanding that Israel demilitarize.  It is 
not realistic.   
I want to create a vision that people will believe in and feel safe about.  
This is not an issue when Palestinians are asked to sign.  This question is an 
American and Israeli question.  Israelis ask me, “How can they give up their 
military power?”  Americans ask the same questions.  But for Palestinians, 
security issues were never the problem.  They became a problem only when 
the Palestinians thought that we were trying to manipulate security in order 
to gain political or economic leverage.  From the beginning, I have not 
thought that it would be a problem on the Palestinian side, but that it would 
be a problem on the Israeli side.  We have to be pragmatic. 
Q:  What does it mean to divide into two states in terms of implication for 
things like rights to water for Palestinians and Israelis, and the 
demographic makeup of the Palestinian and Israeli states under the two-
state paradigm? 
SN: A lot of work has been done in the past on the multilateral issues, 
including water.  I know that there have been many studies done on water 
so as to prevent it from becoming a cause for war.  The problem of water 
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can be solved.  It is not as big a problem as people make it.  It is soluble.  
Let us make peace. 
 
AA:  In reference to water and demography, I had a friend who was a 
commander of the Central Command in the West Bank.  When he had to 
create the new reality that came after Oslo, he could not understand how to 
create a reality in which there are two sovereign entities.  He used to tell 
me, “I have a Polish mother, and she has told me all my life that if I want a 
good neighbor, I should build a wall.  The higher the wall, the better the 
friendship between us.”  I told him, “I am not sure that the Polish model 
describes the right way to handle the relations between us and the 
Palestinians.”  I think that conjoined twins are a better metaphor.  One is 
smaller, one is bigger but they share organs.  When they decide that they 
have to separate, they cannot do it by building a wall or cutting everything.  
This is a very, very sensitive and long operation that should be carried out 
by people who want both of them to survive. 
We understand that there are water problems, and there will be a 
Palestinian minority in Israel.  There are many organs that we shall have to 
share.  While doing it, we have to make sure that both of us will survive. 
Q:  How do you feel about the Geneva Peace Accords57 and how are they 
similar to or different from the ideas that you are putting forward? 
SN:  This agreement was put forward, on the Palestinian side, by a group of 
Palestinians closely associated with the Palestinian leadership, including 
some ex-cabinet ministers, and some cabinet ministers-to-be, but led by 
Yassir Abed Rabbo, who is a member of the Executive Committee of the 
PLO.58  On the Israeli side, it was led primarily by people from the Labor 
Party. 
There are about fifty pages of details concerning the possible agreement 
between the two sides.  The idea was that when they finished it, they were 
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going to announce it, publicize it, and try to and get the two sides to agree 
on it.59 
There are two main differences between that approach and our approach.  
The first is that the Geneva agreement is very detailed.  It has maps.  It has 
specific solutions for different aspects, and does not leave very much room 
for any possible negotiations in the future.  Our plan, however, only outlines 
the parameters and leaves the matter open for translating those parameters 
into details for the leaderships. 
The second main difference is that whereas the Geneva Accords were 
worked out by a group of elites on both sides, ours is something that we are 
trying to get people to sign onto.  Thus, it is a bottom-up rather than a top-
down approach. 
While there are certainly differences in the details, the Geneva agreement 
is a good thing in the sense that it is another step in the direction of creating 
the political environment necessary to bring people back to the table. 
 
AA: From the Israeli point of view, the difference between the Geneva 
agreement and our document is that while the authors of the Geneva 
Accords have suggested that God is in the details, I would remind them that 
the devil is in the details as well.  In other words, sometimes many words do 
not make better ideas.  In this case, for example, the right of return is very 
ambiguous and is translated differently by each side.  One of the reasons 
things collapsed in the past is that previous agreements were constructively 
ambiguous, rather than being a clear and simple vision of the end result.  I 
do not think that we should make any plan based on an ambiguous final 
solution. 
Second, the process itself is different.  From the Israeli point of view, this 
issue is too serious to make a political or party issue.  I do not think that we 
should press for the Left to come back to power in Israel.  This is not what 
we want.  We do not necessarily want to change the administration.  We 
need to approach people from various parties in order to create public 
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support.  We want to influence the way government works, not just change 
the players. . 
Q: What are you trying to achieve by taking your message abroad rather 
than just trying to persuade Israelis and Palestinians to accept your plan?  
Are you trying to generate foreign pressure on Israel? 
AA: I do not want anybody to impose solutions, and I do not want anybody 
to save us from ourselves.  It is up to us, and this is an initiative that was 
started by, and will go forward with, Israelis and Palestinians. 
Yet, the international community should be part of the whole process.  
When we say “international community,” you have to understand that we 
are referring to the United States, whether you want it or not.  The United 
States should understand its role by adopting and giving legitimacy to such 
a process.  However, it is for the Palestinians to decide who will be their 
prime minister or president and what will be their system.  It is in our 
interests that the Palestinians have a democracy, but democracy will not be 
the result of an order from the White House or from our prime minister.  It 
is in our interest on the Israeli side to enhance this process, and it should be 
the interest of the United States and the rest of the international community 
to help make it happen. 
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